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Abstract
We study the structure of markets when traders are given the opportunity to create their own
market, as on the internet. On the internet, public exchanges have in many cases been replaced by
private exchanges. We use experiments to investigate possible reasons for the failure of public
exchanges. In our experimental markets, when traders make an offer, they decide whom to
inform about the offer. Participants typically inform all traders on the other side of the market,
but not on their own side, resulting in a private, not a public exchange. This private exchange
leads to the same outcomes in terms of prices and efficiency as a double auction. When we
impose transaction costs on the buyers, only the sellers make private offers, which results in an
inefficient market. When we provide incentives for sellers to inform each other, most of the
sellers reveal a strict preference to hide offers from rivals. However, when sellers do share price
information, they attain a higher price and benefit collectively. 
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the structure of emerging markets when traders are given the
possibility to create their own private markets. Using experimental methods we study the features
of the resulting market and its efficiency properties. In addition we inquire the robustness of traders’
choices with respect to transaction costs and with respect to costs for concealing information from
competitors.
These experiments shed light on one of the puzzling phenomena of the recent boom in
internet markets. In the last two years, an industry emerged that tried to create new trading
institutions. Public business to business (B2B) exchanges, where traders would reach scores of
potential trading partners was the promise of the Internet.
1 The idea was to “create marketplaces
where buyers and sellers could utilize the Internet’s powers of connectivity and aggregation to
provide instantaneous market information and price visibility, to facilitate transactions with optimal
economic efficiency” (Draenos 2001). “Such market places would act as matchmakers between
buyers and sellers in particular industries, and take a small fee in return” (the Economist 2001).
Furthermore, public B2B exchanges not only offered the potential for new trading partners, but also
for new sorts of transactions, from auctions to direct sales without middlemen or brokers.
2
However, most of the public exchanges have disappeared. “Of the thousand or so B2B
exchanges launched in the past 18 months, only about 100 are handling any genuine transactions.
The doctrine was “build and they will come”, but almost nobody came. Not only are there only a
few public exchanges remaining, but those that do survive play at best only a minor role. Instead the
action in B2B turns out to be elsewhere: in industry specific consortia and in private exchanges
sponsored by large companies” (the Economist 2001).
The advantage of consortia is that at least the founding companies are (presumably)
interested in trading in this exchange. Hence the coordination issue of which of the many markets to
go to in order to find trading partners is mitigated. Jupiter Media Metrix Inc., a New York Internet-
Research firm, counts about 60 industry consortia marketplaces in the U.S. One of the most
promising consortia is Covisint, an online exchange for the automobile industry, where (ideally)
                    
1 “1999 was the year of the public exchange“, Bruce D. Temkin, analyst of Forrester Research in Strauss
(2001).
2 For an overview on Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce see Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001).3
auto manufacturers and suppliers meet to trade through electronic auctions and catalogs.
3 Covisint
was founded and later joined by 6 leading auto makers.
4
Apart from such large designed markets, there are many companies that establish their own
private trading networks. Sometimes with the help of public sites, sometimes on their own. “While
not attracting the attention of public exchanges, which have languished, private business-to-
business exchanges are thriving” (Strauss 2001).
5 Unlike public exchanges which bring together
many suppliers and sellers, private exchanges allow a single firm to deal with its customers or
suppliers directly, and to control who sees what. The preference for private exchanges seems not to
be the result of a lack of public exchanges. For example, in the seafood industry,
GoTradeSeafood.com, a leading business-to-business Internet seafood trading site, offers two ways
of trading seafood. They have a public exchange “Open Market Place” where traders can post offers
“to the world” and “find new suppliers from all over the world”. Furthermore, they also offer a
private exchange, or “Partner Management Program”. Here traders can form private networks,
effectively deciding to which of their trading partners the offers apply to. Specifically, when posting
an offer traders decide which other traders are able to see this offer. This private exchange has been




This emergence of different market institutions, ones that are designed like public
exchanges and consortia, and also ones that simply consist of private exchanges, leaves many open
questions. Foremost the failure of public exchanges was not predicted. Ex post many explanations
have emerged. Maybe there were too many public exchanges, which made it difficult for traders to
coordinate on one exchange, and hence to find each other. Other critics argue that the problem was
                    
3 Other examples include Worldwide Retail Exchange, an e-marketplace founded by more than 50 large
retailers – including Target, J.C. Penney Co. and Safeway Inc.; Transora, a market place created last year
by 50 consumer-products companies, including Kraft Foods Inc., Procter & Gamble Co. and General
Mills Inc.; and Pantellos, a consortium of 21 energy and utility companies, including Entergy Corp. and
PG&E Corp.
4 Covisint was founded by General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co. and DaimlerChrysler AG. Later the
automakers Renault SA, Nissan Motor Corp. and just recently PSA Peugeot-Citroen joined.
5 The article has the colorful title “I Know You, You Know Me, Let’s Sell Goods Online Privately”.
6 Private communication with Jerry ten Brink, CEO of GoTradeSeafood.com.
7 For the construction industry, Lawrence Shorter, vice president for business development and founder of
B2build, sees private trading networks as the core of the model. This allows sellers to filter what buyers see,
or have different price lists for each customer. (Talacko 2001).4
that many exchanges allowed competition on price only, whereas most business deals involve
differentiated goods and services, turning on factors like quality, convenience and reliability as well
a price. “Price isn’t everything. In fact it’s rarely the most important thing” (Paul Milgrom, cited in
Redburn (2000)). However, more sophisticated auction software has emerged, that allows for
multiple attributes (Milgrom 2000), though this is not yet widely used by exchanges. Arguments for
private exchanges are that “you deal with your steady partner. You tighten collaboration with those
partners, and that is where efficiencies come in and relationships are continued” (Bruce T. Temkin,
analyst of Forrester Research in Strauss (2001).) Maybe “people like private exchanges because
they keep control of customers and suppliers. They don’t have to make things public that they don’t
want to” (Tim Clark, analyst of Jupiter research, in Strauss (2001)).
The recent evolution of market institutions on the internet seems to suggest that traders do
not like public exchanges, but rather form private exchanges. One possible reason may be that
private exchanges allow traders to control the flow of information. On the other hand, sometimes
traders on one market side try to commit themselves to use an exchange that provide themselves
and their competitors that participate in the consortium with lots of information. It may be that an
open price policy increases the possibility of collusion and the expected gains are high enough to
overcome the concerns of revealing information to competitors.
8
In this paper we study in a controlled environment the choices traders make concerning the
market structure. We consider an environment where each trader can trade a single homogenous
good. We first investigate two extreme market institutions in terms of information that confirm
its importance on efficiency. One market is the continuous double auction (DA), which we take
as representing the public exchanges. This institution allows traders to make bids (offers to buy)
and asks (offers to sell) and to accept other traders' offers at any moment. Hence, all traders are
informed about all outstanding bids and asks as well as about all realized trades. As a
consequence, the process of price formation and matching is a public and multilateral process.
9
                    
8 Industry consortia are mostly built by firms on only one market side. Covisint, for example, is built by
buyers. However, consortia raise the prospect of collusion between members to the disadvantage of their
suppliers (The Economist 2001). One way in which collusion may occur is through information
transmission. The question about the harm or benefit of price communication between competitors, is old
and still not completely resolved. (The prospect of collusion raises of course the interest of the FTC.
Covisint received tentative antitrust clearance in September 11,  2000.)
9 However the way in which a double auction generates efficient outcomes is not well understood.5
This type of trading institution seems to mostly generate outcomes consistent with the predictions
of the competitive model (see Smith 1962, 1964). At the opposite extreme is a market with
decentralized matching and private bilateral bargaining. This is the institution originally
employed by Chamberlin (1948) in the very first experimental market study (see also the so-
called "telephone markets" in Grether and Plott, 1984, and Hong and Plott, 1982). Under this
institution traders are restricted to contact other traders only one by one, and the offers,
counteroffers and contracts made in these bilateral encounters are not revealed to other traders.
This decentralized bargaining market (DBM) was found to generate inefficient outcomes,
incongruent with the competitive model.
Then we endogenize the information structure and matching procedure of the market. We
give individual traders the possibility to create their own markets, possibilities that traders have
thanks to the internet technology. When a trader submits an offer, she decides who will be
informed about this offer and to whom it applies. She can choose to inform any number of
traders from both the own and the other market side about her offer. If a potential trading partner
is informed about an offer, this offer also applies to her. Hence, if each trader always chooses to
inform every other trader about her offer, the information structure of the market is identical to
that of a double auction, or a public exchange, - every trader is always informed about all
outstanding offers and every offer applies to every potential trading partner. In that case the
market mechanism is in effect a double auction with a centralized information and matching
structure. If, on the other hand, each trader always chooses to inform only one other trader about
her offer, price formation and matching are a completely decentralized process as in
Chamberlin's experiment.
The results of the choices of participants reveal that offers were made by both market sides
and typically transmitted to each potential trading partner. This was to be expected, since each
trader could only trade at most one unit, hence arguments for price discrimination do not apply.
However, the prediction regarding the information traders submit towards their competitors is less
clear. On the one hand, traders may want to conceal an offer from competitors in order to prevent
or delay being overbid (respectively undercut) by competitors. On the other hand, traders may
want to inform rivals about their prices in an attempt at collusion. When competitors know each
others’ offers, secret rebates are excluded. The incentive to outbid or undercut may be reduced6
when rivals can perfectly observe and follow them. After all, “the policing of a price agreement
involves an audit of the transaction prices” (Stigler, 1964, p. 47). In this case the resulting
institution would be equivalent to a standard double auction. In our experiments, even though
subjects did transmit their offers typically to each potential trading partner they chose to hide
them from their competitors. This market institution which endogenously resulted from the
participants choices is best described as a ‘double sided private exchange.’
In the emerging ‘double sided private exchange’ traders receive less information about other
traders decisions and realized transaction prices than in the double auction, though more than in the
decentralized bargaining market. Nonetheless, the resulting institution turned out to share the
properties of the DA in terms of efficiency and price convergence, which are significantly different
from the DBM.
Next we investigate whether the decisions of individual traders adjust to the introduction
of exogenous transaction costs, and whether this adjustment is efficient. Efficiency requires,
firstly, that avoidable transaction costs are in fact avoided, and, secondly, that the market
institution serves its function to inform and match potential trading partners such that potential
gains from trade are realized.
10
Specifically, we consider a treatment with one-sided transaction costs. Whereas sellers
have no transaction costs to bear, a buyer has to bear small, but positive costs for every other
trader he informs about an offer she makes. Note that one-sided transaction costs allow in
principle for the possibility that trade takes place without traders incurring any costs. This allows
for an unambiguous assessment of the efficiency of the market outcome. Furthermore,
transaction cost can be avoided by the emergence of a one sided institution, where only sellers
make offers, but buyers refrain from making bids. Hence, one sided costs allow for a clear
prediction of the institution if its emergence is shaped by the transaction costs. The experiments
show that indeed only sellers made offers, and these asks were transmitted to each buyer, but
                    
10 In order to assess the performance of endogenously emerging market institutions one could of course
investigate field data and historical evidence. However, environmental factors like demand and supply
structure, product characteristics, transactions costs etc. which are decisive for the assessment of trading
outcomes are often not well-documented. These problems, arising from the lack of control and observability
can be overcome by an experimental investigation where the experimenter can design and control the
environment. Therefore, the properties of trading institutions can be easily evaluated in a market
experiment.7
hidden from the other sellers. This institution can be characterized as a ‘one sided private
exchange.’ This emerging institution was less efficient than the DA. A possible reason being the
further reduction of information available to sellers, the active market side. Hence, we can conclude
that transactions costs can indeed shape the emergence of institutions, but the endogenously
emerging market need not lead to efficient outcomes.
We find that even in an environment where there is a homogenous good, traders opted to
conceal their prices and not to inform their competitors, i.e. for private exchanges and not public
exchanges. In the case where both market sides were active, this lead to an outcome as efficient as
the double auction. However in the transaction cost treatment, where only one market side is active,
this price concealment is the probable cause for its inefficient outcome.
This preference of traders for private offers seems at odds with the ongoing creation of
industry consortia in which traders provide competitors (those that are part of the consortium) with
information. Once consortia are built and functional, it will be more costly for traders to trade
outside the consortium and conceal prices. Industry consortia may provide some compensation for
the loss of privacy. Rivals might want to inform each other in order to attempt to collude, and hence
commit themselves to incentives for providing price information. However, the effects of price
communication on prices it not clearly established.
In our last treatment we test whether sellers have strict or weak preferences to conceal prices
from competitors. Specifically, we ‘punish’ price concealment between rival sellers. A seller has to
pay a (small) fine if he or she chooses to conceal a price quote from his or her rivals.
11 Buyers
continue to have the same positive transaction costs as before, so that sellers remain  the active
market side. Furthermore if sellers do inform each other we can measure price communication on
prices and efficiency.
The results show that the preference to conceal their price quotes from their rivals is strict.
A large fraction of price offers is concealed from rivals, even if it is costly for sellers to do so.
However, when rival sellers do inform each other, this price communication among competitors
tends to increase prices significantly. Furthermore, we do not find an strong effect of price
communication on price dispersion or on the speed of convergence.
                    
11 This treatment is inspired by industry consortia, where commitment to a market place should make it
more expensive for traders outside this market place, hiding their prices.8
The next section describes the features of the experimental design common to all
treatments. In section 3 we investigate whether traders form public or private exchanges in
absence of any frictions. Section 4 contains the treatment with transaction costs, and section 5
has traders faced with penalties for concealing information. The concluding discussion can be
found in section 6.
2. Experimental Design
Market Structure
Each experimental market session consisted of a sequence of one practice round and 18 trading
rounds. Each trading round lasted three minutes. Markets were inhabited by 12 traders, 6 buyers
and 6 sellers. Traders retained their roles throughout the session. In a trading round, each
individual trader could trade at most one unit of a homogenous good at no trading costs. The
private value of a trader (cost value or redemption value) changed from round to round. The set
of values, however, remained the same, and this was common knowledge. Hence, the market
environment (i.e., the induced aggregate demand and supply function) was constant across the
practice round and the 18 rounds of the experiment. The cost and redemption values were given
in points, and 1 point exchanged for 0.3 Dutch guilders (Hfl).
12
The demand and supply functions induced by these values are illustrated in Figure 1. As
can be seen, the competitive equilibrium was at a quantity of 4 units and a price in the interval
[30,35]. Hence, for both buyers and sellers there were four infra- and two extra-marginal traders.
The induced demand and supply schedule were, of course, to a large extent arbitrary. Our main
consideration was to strike a balance between the probability of an extra-marginal trade occurring
(a high probability requiring elastic schedules), and the efficiency loss associated with an extra-
marginal trade (a large efficiency losses requiring inelastic schedules).
Besides values, traders were also assigned ID-letters: A, B, C, D, E, and F for buyers, and
U, V, W, X, Y, and Z for sellers. These ID-letters were randomly (re)assigned to the traders at the
beginning of each round. The assignment of ID-letters was neither related to the assignment of
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Figure 1: The induced demand and supply schedule
Information display
The trading process was handled by means of networked computers. At any time a trader's
computer screen displayed the following information: the round number, the time left for trading,
a trader's role (buyer or seller) and ID-letter, the cost or resale value, and a trader's total profits up
to that round. In treatment with transaction costs, the costs a buyer had already incurred during
the round at hand was also displayed on the screen.
In the middle of the display were the lists of ask- and bid prices, one above the other.
These lists only contained those offers that the trader was informed about. Both ask- and bid
prices were ordered from high to low, and for each offer also the ID-letter of the sender was
indicated.
                                                                              
12 At the time of the of the experiment 1 Hfl exchange for about $ 0.50.10
Finally, at the bottom of the screen, there was a row with the prices of those accepted




13 four independent experimental sessions were run. Students at Tilburg
University were recruited as subjects through announcement in the university bulletin and in
classes. Participants were solicited for a two hour decision making experiment which would earn
them money. Fifteen subjects were registered for each experimental session to allow for no-
shows. In session DA1, however, only 10 subjects showed up. This sessions was run with 10
traders, using the design of Figure 1 with one buyer (redemption value 50) and one seller (cost
value 15) excluded, leaving the range of equilibrium prices unchanged.
Upon arrival in the lab, subjects drew an envelope with a seat number. If more than 12
subjects showed up, one to three empty envelopes were added to the stack of seat numbers. The
subjects drawing an empty envelope received 10 Hfl for showing up and left the room. Once the
remaining subjects were seated, the instructions for the experiment were distributed and read
aloud by the experimenter. Then the subjects were given some minutes to study the instructions
at their own pace, and to privately ask questions. After the practice round, the 18 rounds which
determined subjects’ earnings were run. After round 18 the subjects privately received their total
earnings and left the room. Sessions lasted about one and a half hours. Earnings were on average
about Hfl 49, and ranged between Hfl 21 and Hfl 65.
3. Private or Public Exchange
To investigate whether traders prefer public or private exchanges we have three different
markets.
                    
13 The treatments will be described below.11
Trading institutions
(a) Treatment 1: Endogenous Market (EM)
Buyers could try to buy by making bids, and sellers could try to sell by making asks. When making
an offer (an ask or a bid), a trader had to enter a price at which she was prepared to trade. She also
had to enter the IDs of those traders she wanted to inform about the offer. A trader was forced to
enter the ID of at least one trader from the other market side, i.e. the ID of at least one potential
trading partner. This constraint was imposed to prevent traders from sending 'fake' offers to only
their own market side, i.e. to only their competitors. Furthermore, offers that could lead to negative
profits were not permitted.
Offers could be adjusted at any moment by simply submitting a new offer. Then the old
offer became invalid. Hence, each trader had at most one outstanding offer. Since everyone could
trade at most one unit, a trader who had already made a transaction could no longer make offers.
As long as a trader had not traded in that round, she was allowed to accept any offer of a
potential trading partner about which she was informed. Again we enforced the restriction that an
offer could only be accepted if it led to a non-negative profit. We did, however, not enforce the rule
that a trader always had to accept the best price offered. When an offer was accepted, it was
withdrawn from the market, and those traders who had been informed about the offer were also
informed that a transaction had occurred at that price.
(b) Treatment 2: Double Auction (DA)
In the DA treatment, traders did not have to enter any trader ID-letters when submitting an offer.
All offers were automatically sent to all other traders, i.e. to all potential trading partners as well as
to all competitors. All traders were also informed when and at what price a trade occurred. This
treatment boiled down to the standard continuous double-auction market, with the exception that
trader IDs were added and that traders were not restricted to accept the best offer available.
(c) Treatment 3: Decentralized Bargaining Market (DBM)
In the DBM treatment, traders had to enter one and only one ID-letter of a potential trading partner
when they entered an offer. Furthermore, when a transaction occurred, only the two parties involved
were informed.12
Expected Results
To describe the (expected) results it is useful to introduce the following two variables. Dclient
refers to the 'dissemination of an offer among clients', and is defined as the fraction of potential
trading partners informed about an offer. Dcomp refers to the 'dissemination of an offer among
competitors', and is defined as the fraction of competitors (i.e., other traders on the same side of
the market) informed about an offer. These two variables capture the defining features of the
different trading mechanisms.  For example, in a DA we have Dclient = 1 and Dcomp = 1 for all
offers. All traders are informed about all asks and bids. In a DBM we have Dclient = 1/6 and Dcomp
= 0 for all offers. An offer is sent to one trader on the other market side, and no other trader is
informed about it. In the endogenous market treatment the two variables were endogenous and
determined by the traders themselves.
For reasons of symmetry, we did not expect to find any difference between the demand
and the supply side of the market in the EM treatment. That is, we expected that the numbers of
asks and bids were the same, and that Dclient(asks) = Dclient(bids) and Dcomp(ask) = Dcomp(bids).
Moreover, there did not seem to be a compelling reason for traders to send an offer to only a
subset of the potential trading partners. Sending an offer to all potential trading partners could only
increase the probability of acceptance. Furthermore, offers that were not yet accepted could always
be adjusted in any direction. Since each trader could trade at most one unit in our design,
arguments for price discrimination do not apply. Hence, we expected subjects to transmit their
offers to every potential trading partner: Dclient = 1. However, it was not a priori clear what to
expect regarding the information to competitors. On the one hand, traders may want to conceal
an offer from competitors (Dcomp= 0) in order to prevent or delay being overbid (respectively
undercut) by competitors. In that case the resulting institution would be characterized by offers
which apply to all potential trading partners (Dclient= 1) but which are kept secret from competitors
(Dcomp= 0).  Such an institution could be referred to as a ‘double sided private exchange’. On the
other hand, traders may want to inform rivals about their prices in an attempt at collusion. When
competitors know each others’ offers, secret rebates are excluded. The incentive to outbid or
undercut may be reduced when rivals can perfectly observe and follow them. After all, “the
policing of a price agreement involves an audit of the transaction prices” (Stigler, 1964, p. 47). If
competitors decide to inform each other about offers (Dcomp = 1), in combination with Dclient = 1,13
the resulting institution would then be equivalent to a DA.
What did we expect regarding prices and efficiency? As in numerous other DA
experiments, we expected prices and quantities in our DA treatment to converge quickly to the
market clearing level, and outcomes close to full efficiency. For the DBM treatment, on the other
hand, we expected a slower convergence of prices and quantities, connected with lower
efficiency levels.
For the EM treatment, we expected the outcomes to be conditional on the results
regarding Dcomp. If the endogenous market gave rise to an institution that was equivalent to a
double auction, we expected prices, efficiency, and convergence to be in line with the DA
treatment. If, on the other hand, it gave rise to a double sided private exchange then it is more
difficult to predict its outcomes. Such a market has never been investigated before. Nevertheless,
some clear hints are provided by several bounded rationality models which are developed to
explain convergence of prices and quantities in double auctions (Easley and Ledyard 1993,
Friedman 1991, Gode and Sunder 1997, and Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1995). In these models traders
respond adaptively to observations of offers of competitors and potential trading partners and
realized transactions prices. Furthermore, in these models the speed of convergence depends
positively on (the number of) these observations. In a double sided private exchange traders would
typically observe only half of the offers and realized prices, whereas these data are public
information in the DA. Hence, if a double sided private exchange would emerge in the EM
treatment, then a reasonable expectation would be that convergence of prices and quantities to the
market clearing level is slower than in the DA treatment, but faster than in the DBM treatment.
Results
First we examine which market institution actually emerged in the endogenous market treatment
(Result 1). Then we compare prices (Result 2) and efficiency levels (Result 3) across the three
different treatments (EM, DA and DBM).
Result 1. The endogenous market is a double sided private exchange
The market institution emerging in the EM treatment is best described as a double sided private
exchange. Offers were typically sent to every potential trading partner but to no competitor.14
In order to present the evidence for Result 1 we calculated for each offer the value of Dclient,
that is, the number of potential trading partners to whom the offer was sent, divided by the
maximum number to whom it could have been sent (i.e. divided by 6).
14 Notice that Dclient ranged
between 1/6 and 1 since each offer had to be sent to at least one potential trading partner. Similarly,
we computed Dcomp for each offer, that is, the number of competitors who were informed about the
offer divided by the maximum number who could have been informed (i.e. divided by 5). Of
course, Dcomp ranged between 0 and 1.














EM1 0.69 1 55 0.05 0 93
EM2 0.92 1 87 0.09 0 89
EM3 0.94 1 88 0.10 0 87
EM4 0.87 1 82 0.24 0 74
all sessions 0.85 1 77 0.12 0 85
Table 1 presents mean and median values for both Dclient and Dcomp for each of the four EM
sessions separately and averaged over all rounds. Also the percentage of offers with Dclient = 1 and
Dcomp= 0 is indicated. The table shows that an offer was sent to 85% of the potential trading
partners on average, with 100% being the median value. Furthermore, 77% of all offers were sent to
every potential trading partner (Dclient = 1). A look at the session data indicates that this pattern was
representative also for the individual sessions. Even in EM1, where average Dclient was lowest, an
offer applied to all potential trading partners in more than half of the cases.
The dissemination of offers among competitors provided a completely different pattern. On
average, only 12% of the competitors were informed about an offer, and the median value is zero.
In 85% of all cases not one competitor was informed. It is evident that subjects were very reluctant
to share information about their offers with their competitors.
                    
14 Note that this measure underestimates the actual the dissemination of an offer among potential clients,15
 Figure 2: Relative frequencies of dissemination of bids and asks among potential trading partners
(Dclient) and competitors ( Dcomp ) in the EM treatment 
A similar picture arises if one looks at the dissemination of asks and bids separately. Figure 2 shows
the relative frequencies of the different levels of Dclient and Dcomp. In most cases an ask applied to all
buyers and no other seller was informed about the ask, whereas a bid typically applied to all sellers
while no other buyer was informed about it.
                                                                              

























































Figure 3: Development of average Dclient and Dcomp in the EM treatment
This pattern was stable over the time, as can be seen in Figure 3 which displays the
development of average Dclient and Dcomp over the 18 rounds. From the very beginning of a session,
subjects typically made offers to all potential trading partners and did not inform competitors, and
this behavior did not change much over time. We also checked for the development of Dclient and
Dcomp within the rounds. We found no distinctive differences between the beginning and the end of
a round.
Result 2. Prices
Prices in the endogenous market treatments (EM) were as close to the equilibrium price as those in











      Table 2. Average absolute difference between actual prices and equilibrium price range
Session# DA EM DBM
1 0.57 0.54 2.04
2 1.72 0.88 1.26
3 1.49 0.67 1.76
4 0.61 1.08 1.31
All sessions 1.1 0.79 1.59
Remember that in our design the equilibrium price was set-valued (see Figure 1). Therefore,
we looked at the average absolute difference between actual prices and the equilibrium price range
[30,35]. The endogenous market treatment has an average distance to the equilibrium price that is
not significantly different from the double auction, (p=68%).
15 On the other hand, the distance to
the equilibrium price was larger in the DBM-treatment (1.59) than in the EM-treatment.
Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 2, even prices in session EM4 (the EM-session with the
largest distance between actual and equilibrium prices) were closer to equilibrium than prices in
DBM2 (the DBM-session with the lowest distance to equilibrium). Hence, the difference between
EM and DBM was highly significant (p = 2.8%). 
One purpose of market institutions is the provision of a matching and information
structure that allows the traders to reap the gains of trade. Hence, we investigate to what extent
the endogenous institution serves that purpose. We investigated the gains of trade not reaped by
the traders, i.e. we looked to what the extent the sum of consumer and producer surplus fell short
of its maximum level. A natural measure of inefficiency is the foregone surplus as percentage of
the maximum possible surplus. Another measure is the number of inefficient rounds, i.e. the
number of rounds where the forgone surplus was larger than zero. Using either of these two
measures we find:
                    
15 Throughout we employed two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests with session averages as observations.18
Result 3. Efficiency
a)  The forgone surplus in the EM treatment was as low as in the DA treatment.
b)  The forgone surplus was highest in the DBM treatment, and significantly so.
Table 3a. Foregone surplus (in % of total surplus)
Session # DA EM DBM
1 1.48 1.77 6.31
2 0.25 0 7.83
3 1.26 1.26 9.34
4 1.77 0.76 5.30
All sessions 1.19 0.95 7.20
Table 3b. Number of inefficient rounds





All sessions 11 9 41
For each of the three treatments, Table 3a presents the average levels of foregone surplus
and the number of inefficient rounds. The average inefficiency level in the EM and the DA
sessions were about 1% and in the DBM sessions it was about 7%.
16 Contrary to our expectations
the double sided private exchange that endogenously emerged in the EM treatment was about as
efficient as the DA. The efficiency levels of the individual sessions of the two treatments
overlapped and the difference between the treatments was not significant (p = 68%). This shows
                    
16 The impact of a trade of an extramarginal trader as well as that of a non-trade of an intramarginal
trader on efficiency depends of course on the supply and demand conditions. Hence, not the absolute
values of forgone surplus but the differences in efficiency between the treatments are important.19
that an endogenous market institution can be as efficient as the DA. The least efficient institution
was the DBM. Even the most efficient DBM session (DBM4) was less efficient than the least
efficient EM session (EM1). Again, the difference between the EM and the DBM treatment was
highly significant (p = 2.8%).
Qualitatively the same results appeared when we looked at the number of inefficient
rounds (Table 3b). In the EM (DA) treatment only 9 (11) of 72 periods were inefficient. In the
DBM in more than half of the rounds not all gains of trade where reaped (41 inefficient rounds
out of 72). Again the difference between EM and DBM was significant (p = 2.8%), whereas the
difference between DA and EM was not (p > 50%).
For a further examination of the efficiency properties one can distinguish between two
different types of inefficiencies. A round is inefficient whenever an extramarginal buyer or seller
trades. Such inefficient trades can only occur at out-of-equilibrium prices. But even in the
absence of inefficient trades, a round may be inefficient if not all intramarginal traders strike a
deal. Such an inefficient non-trade can occur if potential trading partners do not find each other
or if they cannot agree on the price. It turned out that the inefficiencies during the early rounds of
a session were due to inefficient trades as well as inefficient non-trades. If a later round was
inefficient, however, this was almost always due to inefficient non-trades. This pattern emerged
in all three treatments. Both types of inefficiencies, however, were much more frequent in the
DBM- than in the EM and the DA treatment.
4. Transaction Costs
In the previous section we studied the market that emerges when each trader is given the
technology to costlessly broadcast offers to any subset of traders. We now introduce one-sided
transaction costs to study whether the decisions of traders to whom to broadcast their offers are
influenced by and adapt in a meaningful way to transaction costs.20
Treatment 4: Transaction Costs (TC)
The market technology is as in the endogenous market treatment: Whenever traders make an
offer they have to decide to which potential trading partners and which competitors the offer
should be revealed. Traders can only make offers which apply to at least one potential trading
partner. Sellers could conceal or reveal asks from their competitors at no cost. When submitting
an ask to the market, they could simply decide not to inform any of their competitors, just as they
could decide to inform all of them or just a subset of them. However submitting bids to the
market was costly for the buyers. In particular for each submitted bid, a buyer incurred a cost of
0.25 points for each trader (buyer or seller) whom he wanted to inform of the offer.
In this treatment we expected buyers to be less active by making both less bids and
possibly also broadcasting those bids less widely. Therefore the emerging market should be
rather one sided with sellers doing most of the active offering and buyers to rely mainly on
waiting and accepting offers (which is costless to them). Given that traders chose not inform
competitors in the endogenous market, we may expect that sellers still choose to make private
offers.
17 Together these choices imply that there would be very little information to the active
market side, the sellers. This may lead to inefficiencies. There exists, however, an institution that
is as efficient as the double auction, and entails no transaction costs: the offer auction (Walker
and Williams 1988). In an offer auction only sellers make asks. These asks apply to all buyers
and every trader is informed about all asks and all transaction prices. To achieve this institution,
sellers would have to inform each other about the offers they make, hence communicate their
prices.
Results for the endogenous market with transaction costs (TC)
Result 4. The market structure with transaction costs
The market institution is best described as a one sided private exchange. Most of the offers were
made by sellers and were typically sent to every buyer, but not to any competitor.
                    
17 Buyers now have to incur a cost for informing each other of any bid, this should therefore not lead
them to inform their competitors more often.21
The numbers of asks and bids in the TC treatment provide first evidence for Result 4. Whereas
the introduction of the one-sided transaction costs left the average number of asks per round
unchanged, it decreased the average number of bids from 15.7 to 8.6 (see Table 4).
             Table 4. Average number of offers per round
Offer Session EM TC
1 14.4 11.2
2 15.1 5.6





Asks 3 11.8 20.4
4 17.3 13.7
average 16.5 17.7
The effect of transaction costs on the dissemination of bids among sellers was even more
dramatic than the effect on the number of bids. While in the EM treatment the average Dclient of
bids was 0.858, it dropped in the TC treatment to a level of 0.384 (see Table 5).
On the other hand, the dissemination of asks did not change with the introduction of the
transaction costs. Average Dclient in the TC treatment was 0.853, whereas in the EM it was 0.865 -
typically asks applied to essentially all buyers (see Table 5).  When we combined the effect of the
decrease in the number of bids with the effect of the lower dissemination of bids, we found that
the average number of bids a seller received per round dropped from 13.4 in the EM to 3.3 in the
TC treatment. On the other hand, the average number of asks a buyer receives per round did not
change (14.3 in the EM, 15.1 in TC treatment), and it was about 5 times as large as the number of
bids a seller received in the TC treatment. Hence, we can conclude that the introduction of one-22
sided transaction costs induced the emergence of an institution where offers were made by the
sellers, but not by the buyers. The behavior of traders was stable across periods. Only the average
number of bids in the TC treatment declined slightly further during the course of the experiment.
Hence, in the transaction cost treatment, the more experienced the buyers the less they were
willing to make bids.










1 0.782 0.337 0.099 0.009
2 0.875 0.411 0.080 0.039
Bids 3 0.955 0.423 0.091 0.016
4 0.820 0.366 0.203 0.004
average 0.858 0.384 0.118 0.017
1 0.627 0.838 0.023 0.117
2 0.965 0.810 0.101 0.042
Asks 3 0.923 0.880 0.090 0.074
4 0.945 0.884 0.288 0.122
average 0.865 0.853 0.125 0.089
Like in the EM treatment, the dissemination of offers among competitors (Dcomp) was
very low in the TC treatment (see Table 5).  Hence, in both treatments offers were kept secret
from the competitors.
Result 4 is hence quite favorable to the idea that transaction costs are capable of shaping
the behavior of market participants and hence the resulting market institutions. The introduction
of one-sided transaction costs led to a sharp decrease of costly bids, and the few remaining bids
were much less disseminated.
What is the information structure of the resulting one sided private exchange? In a 'pure'23
one sided private exchange, when only asks are made and competitors are never informed, every
seller knows only his own asks and only his own realized trades. The seller would have even less
information than in the DBM, where he observes sometimes offers of buyers. Of course, in the
TC sessions the emerging one sided private exchange was 'impure', i.e. some bids were made and
some asks were transmitted to other sellers. In the TC treatment an average seller was informed
about 19.8% of the offers made by others, and about 10.8 % of the acceptance of offers made by
others - on average a seller is only informed about every fifth offer and only about every tenth
acceptance of an offer (other than his own offers). In comparison, in the EM treatment an average
seller was informed about 51.5 % of the offers made by others, and about 50.2% of the
acceptance of offers made by others. Of course, in the DBM treatment these numbers are about
9% and 0%, and in the DA both numbers are 100 %. If we look at the evolution of the institution
in the transaction cost treatment over time, we observe no trend towards an institution providing
more information. On the contrary, the percentage of offers a seller is informed about decreases
slightly as buyer learn to avoid transaction costs ad make less offers.
Next we investigate efficiency properties.
18 We have already seen that buyers do incur some
transaction costs. We now investigate the efficiency of transactions only, not taking into account the
wasteful transaction costs.
Result 5: Efficiency of the market with transaction costs
The foregone surplus was significantly higher in the TC treatment that in the endogenous market
treatment (EM) and the double auction (DA). However, the foregone surplus was significantly
lower than in the decentralized bargaining market (DBM).
                    
18 There were no significant differences between the TC and the DBM and EM respectively with respect
to the difference between actual prices and the equilibrium price range.24
Table 6a. Foregone surplus (in % of total surplus)
Session # DA EM TC DBM
1 1.48 1.77 3.54 6.31
2 0.25 0 2.02 7.83
3 1.26 1.26 3.79 9.34
4 1.77 0.76 2.02 5.30
All sessions 1.19 0.95 2.84 7.20
The average inefficiency level was about 3% in the TC treatment as compared to 1% in
the double auction (DA) and the endogenous market (EM) treatments and 7% in the DBM
treatment. Even the most efficient TC sessions (TC2 and TC4) were less efficient than the least
efficient EM (EM1) and DA (DA4) session. The difference between the TC and these two other
treatments was highly significant (p=2.8). However, the least efficient TC session (TC3) was
more efficient than the most efficient DBM session (DBM 4), and efficiency differences were
significant at (p=2.8%).
Table 6b. Number of inefficient rounds





All sessions 11 9 22 41
A similar results hold when we consider the number of inefficient rounds (Table 6b).
These inefficiencies can be caused by inefficient trades (at out of equilibrium prices) or by
inefficient non-trades. Both types occur in early rounds, whereas in later rounds inefficiencies are
mostly caused by inefficient non-trades.25
5. The Effects of Price Communication
So far the emerging markets in our experiments share the feature that traders conceal
offers from their competitors. When, as in the emerging market treatment, both market sides
were active, the resulting institution lead nevertheless to high levels of efficiency. However,
when only one market side was active (while the other had to bear transaction costs), the
resulting institution was inefficient. Furthermore, the efficiency of offer auctions suggests that
this preference of traders to conceal offers is the culprit for the observed inefficiency. We
therefore find strong evidence that even in a homogenous good environment in which traders
were not able to form relationships, traders do not opt for public market institutions. The
emerging markets can be characterized as private exchanges, which are only efficient if both
market sides are active.
This preference for private offers may seem at odds with the ongoing creation of industry
consortia in which traders commit themselves to provide their competitors (those that are
partners in the consortium) with information. There seem to be two (non exclusive) possible
reasons for the formation of industry consortia. The first is that they may increase efficiency. If
we are in a world like the transaction cost treatment, where mostly one market side is active, then
information transmission among sellers would have increased efficiency. Higher levels of
efficiency may increase profits for both market sides, sellers and buyers. A second reason is that
price communication among competitors may allow and facilitate collusion. The hypothesis is
that if sellers in the transaction cost treatment would inform each other, they may be able to
coordinate on higher prices. While this increases profits for sellers, it is bound to reduce profits
for buyers (who therefore may not have incentives to join such markets).
In our last treatment we provide traders with explicit incentives to communicate prices to
their competitors. Specifically traders have to incur (small) costs if they want to conceal offers
from their rivals.
19 This will show whether traders (sellers) have a weak or indeed a strong
preference for not informing their competitors. Furthermore, if sellers chose to inform each other,
we can study the effect of price communication on prices and efficiency.
                    
19 These costs can be thought of as higher costs a seller has to face when she wants to strike a private deal26
Treatment 5: Price Communication (PC)
Treatment 5 is as the transaction cost treatment 4 in that buyers have to bear transaction costs of
0.25 points for each trader (buyer or seller) they inform of the offer. Furthermore a seller incurs a
fixed cost of 0.02 points for each competitor from which she withholds a price quote. The
options to conceal or reveal price quotes are identical to those in treatment 4, only the direct costs
of doing so are different. For example, a price quote can be concealed from all five competitors
at zero costs in treatment 4, the transaction cost treatment, whereas doing so entails a cost of 0.1
points (5 x 0.02) in Treatment 5.
The transaction cost treatment now serves as a baseline treatment to measure the
preferences of sellers to conceal offers and, in case those preferences are not strict, to study the
effects of price communication.
Expected Results for the effect of price communication.
The results of the subsidized price communication treatment will show whether traders
(sellers) have a weak or indeed a strong preference for not informing their competitors. What are
the possible gains of sellers when they choose to inform each other?
First, sellers would avoid the costs for concealing offers from competitors.
Second, we have seen that the TC treatment led to inefficiencies, presumably because the
active market side (the sellers) did not receive enough information. If sellers would choose to
always inform each other, then the resulting institution would resemble an offer auction. In an
offer auction only sellers make asks. These asks apply to all buyers and every trader is informed
about all asks and about every acceptance of an ask. From a previous study (Walker and
Williams 1988) we know that an offer auction exhibits the same properties as the DA. Therefore
price communication among competitors might indeed lead to higher efficiencies and sellers may
be able to claim part of this surplus.
Third, price communication may raise prices. Remember that in our market (Figure 1) the
competitive quantity is 4 and the equilibrium price range is [30,35]. At a market price of 35, the
                                                                              
outside the exchange set up by this sellers’ consortium.27
joint profit of sellers is 70 (and buyers’ profits are 40) which is a considerable improvement over
the joint profits of 50 which they attain at a price of 30 (where buyers’ profits will be 60).
Therefore more information among competitors might lead to a higher average transaction price
than the one achieved in the transaction cost treatment (TC), which is 31.5.
Results for the Price Communication Treatment
Result 6: Communication
Most sellers strictly prefer to conceal their offers from rivals.
In a majority of the cases (59.6% averaged across sessions) sellers do not inform any
competitor even if this secrecy is costly. In the remaining cases at least one rival is informed
about the offer.  In those cases, typically all rivals are informed (averaged across sessions we
have Dcomp=1 for 38.4% of the asks). The average dissemination of offers is higher in the price
communication treatment 5 than in the transaction cost treatment 4, but at Dcomp=0.377 it is still
far below unity. Many sellers are willing to pay for secrecy. There is no tendency for Dcomp to
change much over time.
Table 7. Dissemination of ask prices among sellers
Session # average value of Dcomp % offers with Dcomp=0
TC PC TC PC
1 0.117 0.394 85.4 58.0
2 0.042 0.016 95.2 97.8
3 0.074 0.466 89.5 47.4
4 0.122 0.632 85.8 35.3
average 0.089 0.377 89.0 59.6
Note: Averages and percentages are taken first over the offers within a round and then over the rounds.
As can be seen in Table 7, there is quite some heterogeneity across sessions. Whereas in28
session 2 almost all sellers opted to conceal prices, in PC4 sellers quite often chose to inform
each other.
Result 7: The effects of price communication
Price communication between sellers has a small positive effect on transaction prices.
Table 8 presents average transaction prices for the different sessions and treatments. It
appears that average prices are higher in treatment 5, the Price Communication treatment, (32.6)
than in treatment 4 (31.5). The difference is small and marginally significant at p=0.11 with a
two-tailed Mann-Whitney test and the 8 session averages as observations. This is in line with the
hypothesis that increased price communication between sellers has an upward effect on
transaction prices.
20
Table 8. Mean and standard deviation of transaction prices in the Price Communication
treatment (PC) and the Transaction Cost treatment (TC).
mean price standard deviation
Session # TC PC TC PC
1 32.6 33.4 2.30 3.43
2 31.8 31.4 2.87 3.58
3 31.1 32.8 4.99 3.70
4 30.3 33.0 4.26 2.56
Average 31.5 32.6 3.60 3.32
Notes: Means and standard deviations of prices are taken first over the offers
within a round and then averaged over the rounds.
Since there is a lot of heterogeneity on the amount of price communication across
sessions, we analyze the relation between sellers communication and transaction prices in the PC
                    
20 This effect rests mainly on the early rounds of the experiment. Until round 12, average prices in
treatment 4 (TC) are persistently below those in treatment 5 (PC). In the later rounds, however, their is no
difference between the treatments.29
treatment at a more disaggregated level. For each round we calculate the average level of Dcomp
across all asks (that is, for accepted as well as unaccepted asks). This gives us a measure for the
general level of sellers’ price communication in a round. We compare this to the corresponding
average value of the transaction prices in the round. Across all rounds and sessions, the Pearson
correlation between these two values is significantly positive: rP = 0.44 (n=72,  p<0.01).
The impact of price communication may arise from the fact that offers which were
concealed from rivals (Dcomp=0) were significantly lower (p=0.066) than offers that were
revealed to at least one other seller (Dcomp>0).
21
In sum, we find that increased price communication between sellers increases transaction
prices. The effect is statistically significant but moderate in absolute terms. In particular, average
prices typically stay within the range defined by the competitive equilibrium.
We have seen that sellers display a preference to conceal price quotes (Result 6).
Furthermore, Result 7 indicates that sellers benefit collectively from revealing price quotes. The
next result shows that revealing price quotes has a public goods characteristic.
Result 8
It is individually rational to conceal price offers from competitors.
For each session in the PC treatment, Table 9 reports the average price of accepted asks.
A distinction is made between accepted asks concealed from rivals (Dcomp = 0) and accepted asks
revealed to at least one rival (Dcomp > 0). We find the accepted asks with Dcomp = 0 have an
average price of 33.7 and those with Dcomp > 0 have an average price of 33.3.
22 Although the
difference is small, it is statistically significant  (p = 0.08, n=3). Furthermore, a price difference
of 0.4 is sufficient to warrant the fine of concealment (0.1 = 5 rivals x 0.02) if no more than four
                    
21 The average price of offers with Dcomp > 0 was 42.2, compared to 38.3 for Dcomp > 0.
22 Of all accepted asks in the TC treatment, those with  Dcomp > 0 have an average price of 30.9 and those
with Dcomp = 0 an average price of 32.1. There are however only 9 accepted asks with Dcomp > 0 versus
180 with Dcomp = 0. Therefore, the table focuses on the sessions of the PC treatment.30
price quotes are made before acceptance (the average number of quotes per seller per round is
1.6).
Table 9. Average price for concealed and revealed accepted offers






Notes. p = 0.08 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (n = 3)
These data suggest that concealing price quotes from rivals is indeed the individually
rational thing to do. Even though sellers benefit collectively from price sharing, an individual
seller has little interest to reveal its prices to competitors. By revealing price quotes to
competitors, a seller is more prone to being undercut by a rival seller. Concealed offers can carry
a higher price than revealed offers.
We now explore the effects of price communication on efficiency.
23
Result 9
Low levels of price communication did not significantly improve market efficiency, compared to
the transaction cost treatment. 
                    
23 Recall that prices in the transaction cost treatment were quite close to equilibrium prices, neither
significantly farther than in the endogenous market treatment, nor significantly closer than in the
decentralized bargaining market. Therefore, we are not surprised to find that price communication has no31
Table 10. Foregone surplus (in % of total surplus)
Session # EM PC TC
1 1.77 2.8 3.54
2 0 2 2.02
3 1.26 3 3.79
4 0.76 0.3 2.02
All sessions 0.95 2.02 2.84
 Table 10 indicates that the average level of efficiency is higher in the price
communication treatment (PC) than in the transaction cost treatment (TC), though not as high as
in the emerging market treatment (EM). None of the differences are statistically significant,
however. In PC 1-3, the sessions with low levels of price communication, the efficiency was as
low as in the transaction cost treatment. Only session 4, in which sellers informed each other of
around 65% of the offers, showed high levels of efficiency, comparable to the ones of the
endogenous market treatment.  
The results of the price communication treatment suggests that many traders have not just
weak, but strong preferences to conceal information from their competitors. If traders would
manage to provide incentives to disclose information to competitors, they would, collectively,
benefit, to the detriments of the buyers. Price communication among competitors is characterized
by public good features. Even though sellers would collectively benefit, each seller has incentives
to keep her own ask secret.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
To investigate the driving forces that shape emerging market institutions we conduct
experiments in which we endogenized the information and matching procedure. In our
experiments the resulting institutions can be best characterized as private exchanges. When
                                                                              
effect on price dispersion or convergence.32
traders had the opportunity, they chose to conceal offers from their competitors. These
institutions provided less information than the double auction (where traders learned about all
offers and all transaction prices), which can be thought of as a representative for public
exchanges. Nevertheless the double sided private exchange mimicked the double auction in
terms of efficiency and convergence to market clearing prices. In contrast, in a Decentralized
Bargaining Market, where each trader is only allowed to communicate with one potential trading
partner at a time, prices converged more slowly and efficiency was lower. These results imply that
explanations for the efficiency of the double auction, which mostly heavily rely on information
traders receive about their competitors, cannot capture our results, and hence may not capture the
essential features that make the double auction so efficient.
When imposing one sided transaction costs on the buyers only the sellers made offers. This
shows that even small transaction costs can shape the matching and information structure of
markets. The preference of sellers to conceal their offers resulted the market to be a one sided
private exchange which led to inefficient trading outcomes.
Even when sellers had to bear small costs, such that it becomes costly to hide information
from the competitors, many sellers are willing to pay these costs. Providing information to
competitors has features of a public good. Collectively the sellers would profit, by maintaining
higher prices, though individually each seller has an incentive to keep her prices secret.
With the technology of the internet, it was presumed that traders would abandon private
offers and conduct their trades publicly on public exchanges. However, many of the public
exchanges failed. Our experiments support the hypothesis that this failure of public markets was
not just due to a lack of the relevant technology, but due to traders’ preferences for hiding
information from competitors.33
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Appendix: This appendix contains the instructions for the TC treatment. For the treatments DA, DBM, EM
and PC we adapted the instructions accordingly.
Instructions:
Today we are going to set up a market in which some of you will be buyers and others will be sellers. Those
of you who have drawn a "B" are buyers, those of you with a "S" are sellers. During the experiment you will
have to make trading decisions and these decisions will determine your earnings. During the experiment
your earnings will be denoted in points. For each point you earn you will get 30 cents for your participation.
Your earnings will be paid to you privately and in cash after the experiment.
First, we will go through the instructions together. After that you will get the opportunity to study
the instructions in your own pace and to ask questions. Also we will have a practice round before we start
the experiment. If you want to make notes you can use the empty sheet that is on your table. Please, do not
write on the instructions, and do not touch the keyboard until we are done with the instructions.
The experiment will consist of 18 trading rounds. In each trading round each buyer may buy at most
one unit. Each seller may sell at most one unit. Trades are made in accordance with certain rules that will be
explained below. If a buyer buys a unit in a round, her gross-earnings are equal to the resale-value of the
unit to her minus the price she pays for the unit. If a buyer does not buy a unit, her gross-earnings for that
round are zero. If a seller sells a unit in a round, his gross-earnings are equal to the price he receives for the
unit minus the cost-value of the unit to the seller. If a seller does not sell a unit, his gross-earnings for that
round are zero.
Resale-values as well as cost-values are strictly private information, no other participant than the
concerning buyer or seller, respectively, will learn about it. Hence, every participant knows only his own
gross-earnings from a trade. Your net-earnings in a round are equal to your gross-earnings minus the cost
you made by sending offers to other traders. How these latter costs are determined will be explained below.
Finally, your total earnings for the experiment are equal to the sum of your net-earnings in each of the 18
rounds.
Computer screen
The trading of units will take place by means of the computer. All relevant information will be available on
your computer screen. You can now see what the screen will look like during the experiment.
In the top left of the screen you can see how many points you have earned up to that moment. Also
the number of the present round is indicated. Below that you see how much time is left for trading in that36
round. For each of the 18 rounds the total time for trading is 3 minutes.
In the middle of the screen you will see a list of the relevant ask and bid-prices. An ask-price
indicates the price at which a seller is prepared to sell, and a bid-price indicates the price at which a buyer is
prepared to buy. Ask- and bid-prices will be explained in more detail below.
On the right-hand side of the screen your value is indicated. If you are a buyer, the resale-value of a
unit in that round is indicated. If you are a seller, the cost-value of a unit in that round is indicated. Resale-
values may be different for different buyers, and cost-values may be different for different sellers. Also your
value may change from round to round. But every buyer gets the same resale-values the same number of
rounds, and every seller gets the same cost-values the same number of rounds. Also you can see where your
gross-earnings will be indicated, and that your net-earnings for the round will be equal to your gross-
earnings minus the cost you have made in sending offers (as will be explained below).
In the middle left of the screen you see whether you are a buyer or a seller. Here also your ID-letter
is indicated. The IDs for the buyers are A, B, C, D, E and F. The IDs for the sellers are U, V, W, X, Y and Z.
Your ID will randomly change from round to round. Furthermore, IDs are not related to the cost- or resale-
values. Hence, the IDs are for registration purposes only and do not convey information about the identity of
participants or about their values.
In the bottom right of the screen you see a box called last action. This box mentions the last action
that is relevant to you.
Finally, at the bottom of the screen you see a long flat row. In this row you are informed about all
accepted asks and bids that were in your column of ask- and bid-prices.
Now we will first go through the specific instructions for buyers, and then through the specific
instructions for sellers. On your hand-out you will only find the specific instructions that concern your role
in the market.
Specific instructions for buyers
After the determination of the values and the IDs, the market opens for trading. If you want to buy a unit,
and you have not yet bought a unit in that round, then you can do two things:
(1) You can press B to make a bid and to enter a price at which you are prepared to buy a unit. After
you press B you are requested to enter a bid-price. This bid-price must be above  or equal to zero and below
or equal to your resale-value. After you have entered your bid-price, you must decide to which sellers you
want to send your bid and which of the other buyers you want to inform about your bid. You may send your
bid to any number of sellers, but at least to one seller. You may inform any of the other buyers about your37
bid, but you are not obliged to do so. Therefore, after you entered your bid-price, you are also requested to
enter the ID(s) of at least one seller to whom you want to send this bid and of any of the other buyers you
want to inform. Hence, you may enter as many of the seller ID-letters (U, V, W, X, Y, Z) and buyer ID-
letters (A, B, C, D, E, F) as you want, but you should at least enter one seller ID-letter. Recall that the IDs
change from round to round. After you have entered the ID(s), your bid-price will appear in the lower
middle of your screen in the column "bids" and it is marked with an asterix (*). Now your bid-price is
transmitted to the sellers and buyers you have entered, and will appear in their columns of bid-prices
together with your ID.
By sending your bid to a seller or another buyer you incur a cost. To be precise, for each of the
other traders (seller or buyer) that you decide to inform about your bid, you incur a fixed cost of 0.25 points.
The total cost you incur by sending bids to other traders will be subtracted from your gross-earnings to
determine your net-earnings for the round.
A seller who receives your bid may accept it or not. The buyers you selected can of course not
accept your bid - they are only informed about it. As soon as one of the sellers accepts your bid, you will get
a message in the lower-right corner of your screen under "last action", and the corresponding earnings will
be calculated and indicated on your screen under "value". Also all other sellers and buyers you have chosen
to send your bid to will learn that your bid is accepted. Your bid-price will vanish from their column "bids"
and will appear in the row at the bottom of their screens.
If your bid is not accepted by a seller, you will not get a message. Notice that it is possible that you
send a bid to a seller who has already sold a unit to another buyer. Hence, receiving no message may mean
that the sellers you selected to send your bid to have not yet decided about your bid, that they reject it, or
that they already sold a unit.
As long as you have not bought a unit in the trading round you may always revise your bid by just
pressing "B", entering a (possibly new) price, and entering (possibly new) sellers' and buyers' IDs. If you
enter a new bid, your old bid will disappear. By making a new bid you again incur a fixed cost for each of
the other traders that you decide to inform about your new bid. However, you are not forced to make any
(new) bid. Like buyers can make bids, sellers can make asks. This brings us to the second thing you can do
to buy a unit.
(2) You can press on K. In that case you can buy one unit at one of the ask-prices that is indicated in
the column "asks" in the upper-middle of your screen. Of course, you cannot use this option if this column is
empty. If an ask-price is indicated in this column, then one of the sellers (indicated by his ID-letter) is
prepared to sell a unit to you at the indicated price. If you decide to accept this ask-price you simply press K.38
Since there may be more than one ask-price in the column, you also need to enter the seller-ID of the ask
you wish to accept. Then the trade is conducted, your earnings are registered, and all buyers and sellers who
were informed about this ask can see at the bottom of their screen that a trade has occurred at this price.
Specific instructions for sellers
After the determination of the values and the IDs, the market opens for trading. If you want to sell a unit and
you have not yet sold a unit in that round, you can do two things:
(1) You can press P to make an ask and to enter a price at which you are prepared to sell a unit.
After you press P you are requested to enter an ask-price. This ask-price must be below or equal to 100 and
above or equal to your cost-value. After you have entered your ask-price, you must decide to which buyers
you want to send the ask and which of the other sellers you want to inform about your ask. You may send
your ask to any number of buyers, but at least to one buyer. You may inform any of the other sellers about
your offer, but you are not obliged to do so. Therefore, after you entered your ask-price, you are also
requested to enter the ID(s) of at least one buyer to whom you want to send this ask, and of any of the other
sellers that you want to inform. Hence, you may enter as many of the buyer ID-letters (A, B, C, D, E, F) and
seller ID-letters (U, V, W, X, Y, Z) as you want, but you should at least enter one buyer ID-letter. Recall
that the IDs change from round to round. After you have entered the ID(s), your ask-price will appear in the
upper middle of your screen in the column "asks" and it is marked with an asterix (*). Now your ask-price is
transmitted to the buyers and sellers you have entered, and will appear in their columns of ask-prices
together with your ID.
For each of the other traders (buyer or seller) that you decide to inform about your ask, you incur a
fixed cost of zero - by sending your ask to a buyer or another seller you does not incur any cost. Hence if
you make a trade in a round, your net-earnings for that round are equal to your gross-earnings.
A buyer who receives your ask may accept it or not. The sellers you selected can of course not
accept your ask - they are only informed about it. As soon as one of the buyers accepts your ask, you will
get a message in the lower-right corner of your screen under "last action", and the corresponding earnings
will be calculated and indicated on your screen under "value". Also all other buyers and sellers you have
selected to send your ask to will learn that your ask is accepted. Your ask-price will vanish from their
column "asks" and appear in a row at the bottom of their screens.
If your ask is not accepted by a buyer, you will not get a message. Notice that it is possible that you
send an ask to a buyer who has already bought a unit from another seller. Hence, receiving no message may
mean that the buyers you selected to send your ask to have not yet decided about your ask, that they reject it,39
or that they have already bought a unit.
As long as you have not sold a unit in the trading round you may always revise you ask by just
pressing "P", entering a (possibly new) price, and entering (possibly new) buyers' and sellers' IDs. If you
enter a new ask, your old ask will disappear. However, you are not forced to enter any (new) ask. Like
sellers can send asks, buyers can make bids. This brings us to the second thing you can do to sell a unit.
(2) You can press on V. In that case you can sell a unit at one of the bid-prices that is indicated in
the column "bids" in the lower middle of your screen. Of course, you cannot use this option if this column is
empty. If a bid-price is indicated in this column, then one of the buyers (indicated by her ID-letter) is
prepared to buy a unit from you at the indicated price. If you decide to accept this bid-price you simply press
V. Since there may be more than one bid-price in the column, you also need to enter the buyer-ID of the bid
you wish to accept. Then the trade is conducted, your earnings are registered, and all sellers and buyers who
were informed about this bid-price can see at the bottom of the screen that a trade has occurred at this price.
Summary
The experiment consists of 18 trading rounds, and each round lasts 3 minutes. You are either a buyer or a
seller. In a round each buyer may try to buy one unit and each seller may try to sell one unit. For a buyer,
gross-earnings will be equal to the resale-value of the unit minus the price paid. For a seller, gross-earnings
will be equal to the price received minus the cost-value of the unit. Values are different for different traders,
and they change from round to round. Buyers can try to buy by making bids or by accepting asks. Sellers
can try to sell by making asks or accepting bids. Buyers' net-earnings in a round are equal to their gross-
earnings minus the cost they made in sending bids to other traders. Each time a buyer makes a bid she incurs
a cost of 0.25 points for every seller or buyer she decides to inform about this bid. Sellers costs from sending
asks to other traders are zero. Therefore, their net-earnings are equal their gross earning.
During the experiment all earnings are denoted in points. After the experiment, your earnings in
cash will be determined at a rate of 1 point = 30 cents. You will receive your earnings privately,
immediately after the experiment. Your earnings are your own business, you do not have to discuss them
with anyone.
Final remarks
During the experiment, it is not allowed to talk or communicate with other participants in any way (other
then through the trading). If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to
your table. If anything strange appears on your screen, or if you think the computer is not doing what you
think it should, please notify the experimenter so he can try to fix the problem.